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Cyber exploitation is a new means of intelligence gathering. It refers to 
unauthorised access to computers, computer systems, or networks, in order 
to gain information, without affecting the functionality of the accessed sys-
tem or deleting the data contained or in transit therein. States employ cyber 
exploitation both in peacetime and in wartime since cyber exploitation often 
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proves relevant both in order to plan and launch an attack and in order to 
gain information for defensive purposes. 
Since international humanitarian law is the law that regulates the conduct 
of the hostilities, it is necessary to test the applicability of its rules to cyber 
exploitation. Cyber exploitation proves particularly problematic because it 
is an extremely recent phenomenon, while international humanitarian law 
rules were mainly codified in 1907, 1949 and 1977, when cyber warfare had 
not yet been envisaged. Accordingly, the application of these old provisions 
to such a new phenomenon requires an in depth analysis. 
To this end, this paper first examines the international humanitarian law 
rules regarding intelligence collection in wartime, with particular regard 
given to espionage. This paper goes on to verify whether these old rules are 
applicable and relevant to the case of cyber exploitation. Finally, this paper 
examines the applicability of the rules regarding direct participation of civil-
ians in hostilities to instances involving cyber exploitation. 
This paper concludes postulating that international humanitarian law 
considers cyber exploitation to be a lawful activity since these rules do not 
prohibit intelligence gathering. However, this paper further demonstrates 
that specific international humanitarian law rules are not applicable to cyber 
exploitation, apart from very marginal and unpractical cases. 
 
Oh friends! hath no Achaian here such trust 
In his own prowess, as to venture forth 
Among yon haughty Trojans? He, perchance, 
Might on the borders of their host surprise 
Some wandering adversary, or might learn 
Their consultations, whether they propose 
Here to abide in prospect of the fleet, 
Or, satiate with success against the Greeks 
So signal, meditate retreat to Troy. 
These tidings gain’d, should he at last return 
Secure, his recompense will be renown 
Extensive as the heavens, and fair reward.1 
 
  
                                                        
1  Homer, Iliad, X, 240 et seq., English translation available at <archive.org>. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The way in which hostilities and warfare are conducted changes con-
stantly, evolving very rapidly. Men and women have tried to improve their 
capacity to kill other men and women seemingly with the same persever-
ance as natural predators in the wilderness strives to become faster than 
their prey. The rule at the basis of the entire evolutionary model is that even 
preys evolve, and thus, the predators will ultimately never be able to prevail 
completely. However, they will try to evolve further, and the evolution of 
both prey and predator will continue.2 
The same phenomenon can be observed in the evolution of the activity of 
intelligence gathering, one of the oldest human activities connected with the 
art of warfare, going back further than the times of Homer. Since the dawn 
of civilisation as we know it, powers have been exploring new ways to gath-
er information about their enemies in times of armed conflict, but their ef-
forts have been matched by the equal struggles of other powers to develop 
more sophisticated defences against enemy intelligence activity. As with 
wildlife, this balance between two opposite forces is at the basis of the fren-
zied evolution of intelligence gathering techniques and technologies.3 
However, the evolution of the instruments through which mankind steals 
its enemies’ secrets has not been equally matched by a similar evolution of 
the international law rules regarding intelligence gathering in wartime. The 
relevant rules are embodied in the international humanitarian law conven-
tions, which were adopted between 1899 and 1977. Frankly, these rules are 
quite outdated compared to the technological revolution that has radically 
changed the way information is collected in wartime since the end of the 
twentieth century, continuing through the beginning of the new millenni-
um. 
This paper focuses on a specific means of intelligence collection, cyber 
exploitation, and on the applicability of international humanitarian law to 
this new phenomenon. The paper begins by defining what cyber exploita-
tion encompasses. After an examination of the international humanitarian 
law rules regarding the collection of intelligence in wartime and specifically 
                                                        
2  It should be superfluous to mention here the masterpiece of C. Darwin, The Origins of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection, 1859. 
3  For an overview of this process, see F. Calvi/O. Schmidt, Intelligences secrètes: annales 
de l’espionnage, 1988; A. N. Shulsky/G. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of 
Intelligence, 3rd ed. 2002; J. Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Na-
poleon to Al-Quaeda, 2003. 
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regarding espionage, the paper moves on to verify whether these old rules 
are applicable and relevant for cyber exploitation. Moreover, the paper 
analyses the applicability of the rules on direct participation of civilians in 
the hostilities to cyber exploitation. The paper concludes by positing that, 
even though international humanitarian law is not completely silent regard-
ing intelligence gathering activity through this means, the old international 
humanitarian law rules are not entirely adequate to regulate this new phe-
nomenon of cyber exploitation. 
 
 
II. Intelligence Collection in Wartime: An Overview 
 
Intelligence collection in wartime is a practice as old as war itself, and is 
often nicknamed the second oldest profession.4 Acquiring information in 
times of armed conflict is crucial. An attacking army needs to know the po-
sition of the enemy, their strengths, the number of troops presiding over 
military objectives, the intentions of the enemy commanders, and other 
similar circumstances that, if known, could impact the success of offensive 
and defensive operations. This information is considered so critical that 
states usually cloak the entire war process in secrecy in order to prevent the 
enemy from gaining relevant information.5 Generally, the activity of collect-
ing information is called intelligence gathering,6 and it can be performed 
both in times of peace and war. 
The most striking difference between peacetime and wartime intelligence 
collection is that, according to a number of authoritative publicists, interna-
tional law neither prohibits nor allows peacetime intelligence collection,7 
                                                        
4  P. Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century, 
1980. 
5  See O. Ben-Naftali/R. Peled, How Much Secrecy Does Warfare Need?, in: A. Bian-
chi/A. Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law, 2013, 321 et seq. 
6  Other definitions of intelligence encompass other activities as well. For instance, on the 
basis of some domestic legislation, some publicists consider that extraterritorial covert mili-
tary operations fall into the definition of intelligence (see e.g. L. Salvadego, La nuova disci-
plina italiana sulle operazioni di “intelligence di contrasto” all’estero, Riv. Dir. Int. 99 (2016), 
1187 et seq.). 
7  See R. A. Falk, Foreword, in: R. J. Stanger (ed.), Essays on Espionage and International 
Law, 1962, i et seq., v; S. Chesterman, The Spy Who Came from the Cold War: Intelligence 
and International Law, Mich. J. Int’l L. Michigan Journal 27 (2006), 1071 et seq.; G. Sul-
masy/J. Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Collection and International Law, Mich. J. Int’l L. 
28 (2007), 635 et seq. For recent overviews of this topic, see I. Navarrete, L’espionnage en 
temps de paix en droit international public, Can. Yb. Int’l L. 63 (2016), 1 et seq.; K. Kitti-
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while international humanitarian law clearly considers intelligence collec-
tion in wartime to be lawful. According to Art. 24 of the 1907 Hague Regu-
lations (HR), “[r]uses of war and the employment of measures necessary for 
obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered 
permissible”.8 This rule is embodied in a number of international instru-
ments regarding the law of war,9 and it is part of customary international 
law. Accordingly, a state involved in intelligence gathering during an armed 
conflict does not breach international humanitarian law, but rather it exer-
cises a prerogative that is connected with its freedom to choose the means 
and method of warfare. 
Moreover, an attacking state is compelled to gather certain information in 
order to verify the nature of the objective of the attack and its consequences 
pursuant to Art. 57(2)(a)(i) of the First Additional Protocol (AP I).10 One 
can therefore conclude that intelligence collection in wartime is an activity 
that states can lawfully undertake for the success of a military operation; at 
the same time, an attacking state must perform intelligence collection in or-
der to implement the principles of distinction and proportionality. 
Intelligence collection covers a number of different activities, developed 
since the ancient times for as long as new technological devices and tech-
niques have been being devised. One can classify intelligence collection on 
the basis of different criteria, based on the methods employed (human intel-
ligence, communication intelligence, financial intelligence)11, or the object 
                                                                                                                                  
chaisaree, Public International Law of Cyberspace, 2017, 233 et seq. For the view that states 
have the right to collect intelligence information, see A. Lubin, Espionage as a Sovereign 
Right Under International Law and Its Limits, ILSA Quarterly 24 (2016), 22 et seq. 
 8  Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18.10.1907 (HR). 
 9  Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brus-
sels, 27.8.1874 (Brussels Declaration), available at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org>, Art. 14; 
HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Bern, 15.5.2009 
(HPCR Manual), available at <ihlresearch.org>, Rule 119. See also Instructions for the Gov-
ernment of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), 24.4.1863, available at 
<www.icrc.org>, Art. 101, which is the first codification of the law of armed conflict, albeit in 
the form of a domestic military manual. 
10  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12.8.1949, and relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8.6.1977 (API) <www. 
icrc.org>. On this topic, see M. Longobardo, L’obbligo di verificare l’obiettivo e le conse-
guenze di un attacco ai sensi del diritto internazionale umanitario e nuove forme di intelligen-
ce: profili di responsabilità internazionale, in: A. Spagnolo/S. Saluzzo (eds.), La responsabilità 
degli Stati e delle organizzazioni internazionali: nuove fattispecie e problemi di attribuzione e 
di accertamento, 2017, forthcoming, available at <papers.ssrn.com>. 
11  See A. Sambei, Intelligence Cooperation versus Evidence Collection and Dissemina-
tion, in: L. van den Herik/N. Schrijver (eds.), Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented 
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and scope of the activity itself (strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence, 
operation intelligence)12, or its scale (mass surveillance or targeted surveil-
lance). Despite the fact that all these categories are useful for an understand-
ing of the complexities of intelligence collection and its adaptability to dif-
ferent exigencies, the only means of intelligence collection specifically ex-
amined by international humanitarian law is espionage, which is regulated 
by a number of international law conventions pertaining to the law of 
armed conflict. Other than in the case of espionage, international humani-
tarian law merely considers the genus “intelligence” to be lawful, not paying 
any attention to the specific way in which it is undertaken, at least as long as 
it does not constitute an act of perfidy prohibited by Art. 37 AP I. 
 
 
III. The Practice of Cyber Exploitation 
 
Traditionally, war has been combatted in the physical realms of land, sea, 
air, and – in recent times – space. In recent decades, a new intangible battle-
field – cyberspace – has become increasingly relevant.13 In this realm, tech-
nology allows states to conduct war-like operations that are commonly de-
fined as cyber operations. Even if there is no general consensus on the exact 
definition of cyber operations, for practical reasons this paper relies on the 
definition recently embodied in the 2016 United States (US) Military Manu-
al, according to which cyber operations are 
 
                                                                                                                                  
Legal Order, 2013, 212 et seq., 216 et seq. Other authors suggest different classifications (see 
e.g. W. Gracido/J. Pirc, Cybercrime and Espionage: An Analysis of Subversive Multivector 
Threats, 2011, 96 et seq.). 
12  See W. Gracido/J. Pirc (note 11), 91 et seq. 
13  The literature on cyberspace as battlefield is particularly vast. See, among many others, 
H. Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, 2012; M. N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 2013 (Tallinn Manual); L. 
Baudin, Les cyber-attaques dans les conflits armés: qualification juridique, imputabilité et 
moyens de réponse envisagés en droit international humanitaire, 2014; M. Roscini, Cyber Op-
erations and the Use of Force in International Law, 2014; Y. Radziwill, Cyber-Attacks and the 
Exploitable Imperfections of International Law, 2015; C.-J. Woltag, Cyber Warfare: Military 
Cross-Border Computer Network Operations under International Law, 2015; K. Kittichaisa-
ree (note 7), 201 et seq.; M. N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Ap-
plicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd ed. 2017 (Tallinn Manual 2.0). See also the papers published 
in R. Buchan/N. Tsagourias (eds.), Symposium: Cyber War and International Law, Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 17 (2012), 183 et seq.; R. Buchan/N. Tsagourias (eds.), Special Is-
sue: Non-state Actors and Responsibility in Cyberspace: State Responsibility, Individual 
Criminal Responsibility and Issues of Evidence, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 21 
(2016), 377 et seq. 
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“those operations that involve ‘[t]he employment of cyberspace capabilities 
where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace’. 
Cyber operations: (1) use cyber capabilities, such as computers, software tools, 
or networks; and (2) have a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in 
or through cyberspace.”14 
 
Normally, cyber operations are divided into two main categories: cyber-
attacks and cyber exploitation. A cyber-attack “is a cyber operation, wheth-
er offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or 
death to persons or damage or destruction to objects”.15 In the view of the 
US Department of Defense, cyber exploitation (or computer network ex-
ploitation) is an “[e]nabling operation[ ] and intelligence collection to gather 
data from target or adversary automated information systems or net-
works”.16 Accordingly, the main difference between cyber-attacks and 
cyber exploitation operations is in the nature of the payload to be executed: 
in cases of cyber exploitation, the computer or system targeted is not dis-
rupted or damaged, and the data transient therein are not altered, corrupted 
or deleted.17 Even though cyber-attacks and cyber exploitation are often 
conducted jointly and with similar means, they are different phenomena 
that must be kept distinct. 
Cyber exploitation may be performed both in times of peace and in times 
of war. With regard to recent peacetime practice,18 for instance it can be re-
called that Georgia recently affirmed that Russian security agencies had col-
lected confidential information by infiltrating malware in some Georgian 
security servers.19 
                                                        
14  US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (Updated December 2016), 16.1.2 (ref-
erences omitted). See also the definitions embodied in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), 258, and 
in ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts, ICRC Doc 31IC/11/5.1.2, October 2011, 36. 
15  Rule 92 in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), 106. 
16  See US Department of Defense, Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations, 4, para. 
5. 
17  See H. S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, Journal of National 
Security Law and Policy 4 (2010), 63 et seq., 64; M. Roscini (note 13), 16. 
18  For an overview of this practice in peacetime and valuable remarks on its legal implica-
tions, see H. P. Aust, Spionage im Zeitalter von Big Data – Globale Überwachung und der 
Schutz der Privatsphäre im Völkerrecht, AVR 52 (2014), 375 et seq.; R. Buchan, Cyber Espio-
nage and International Law, in: N. Tsagourias/R. Buchan (eds.), Research Handbook on In-
ternational Law and Cyberspace, 2015, 168 et seq. 
19  See Georgian Ministry of Justice, Cyber Espionage Against Georgian Government, 
available at <dea.gov.ge>. Moreover, it has been reported that the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was targeted by operations of cyber exploitation in 2016 (see S. Kirchgaessner, Russia 
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As to recent wartime practice, it has been reported that both the Syrian 
government and the opposing groups are involved in cyber exploitation ac-
tivities,20 while, in 2014, Hamas claimed to have violated Israeli governmen-
tal systems and to have stolen some data.21 Moreover, in 2015, a Kosovo cit-
izen was arrested in Malaysia under suspicion of having stolen US service 
members’ data on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).22 In 
addition, the relevance of these kinds of cyber operations during armed 
conflict is evident in a number of military manuals and doctrines, all of 
which emphasise the role of confidential information exploited through cy-
berspace in relation to different aspects of the conduct of hostilities.23 
Consequently, because of the present and future importance of cyber ex-
ploitation to the manner in which States conduct hostilities, determining 
whether international humanitarian law regulates these cyber exploitation 
operations is crucial. 
  
                                                                                                                                  
Suspected over Hacking Attack on Italian Foreign Ministry, The Guardian, 10.2.2017, availa-
ble at <www.theguardian.com). 
20  See J. Sahalni, In Syria, the Cyberwar Intensifies, 20.2.2013, available at <www.oiip. 
ac.at>. 
21  See Hamas “Hacks into” Israeli Defence Computers and Leak Video Footage, Interna-
tional Business Times, 14.12.2014, available at <www.ibtimes.co.uk>. 
22  See U.S. Accuses Hacker of Stealing Military Members’ Data and Giving It to ISIS, The 
Washington Post, 16.10.2015, available at <www.washingtonpost.com>. 
23  See U.S. Department of the Army, Targeting, ATP 3-0, FM 3-60, May 2015, Section B-
29: “[…] Documents and pocket litter, as well as information found on computers and cell 
phones, can provide clues that analysts need to evaluate enemy organizations, capabilities, and 
intentions. The threat’s network becomes known a little more clearly by reading his email, 
financial records, media, and servers. Target and document exploitation help build the picture 
of the threat as a system of systems.” 
See also Republica de Colombia, Manual de Doctrina Básica Aérea y Espacial, 4th ed. 2013, 
86: “Ciber-inteligencia: Son operaciones realizadas en el ciberespacio encaminadas a recolec-
tar, procesar, explotar y difundir información para el planeamiento y ejecución de operaciones 
Aéreas, Espaciales y Ciberespaciales.” 
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IV. Cyber Exploitation as a Modern Kind of Espionage in 
Times of War 
 
1. The Regime of Espionage under International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
a) The Definition of Espionage and Spies 
 
International humanitarian law conventions, non-binding private codifi-
cations, and military manuals generally address espionage in a coherent way, 
so that today, one can easily conclude that the regulation of espionage is the 
same both in treaty and customary international humanitarian law.24 
Espionage falls into the definition of ruses of war not amounting to per-
fidy pursuant to Art. 24 HR. Consequently, espionage in times of war is a 
lawful method of war, as recognized by national case law.25 
Espionage may be performed either by members of the enemy armed 
force or by civilians. According to the HR and a number of non-binding 
private codifications, spies are “individuals” or “persons”.26 Such a classifi-
cation implies that both soldiers and civilians can be considered to be 
spies.27 This conclusion is confirmed by Art. 5 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention (IV GC) which regulates the guarantees pertaining to “individual 
protected person[s] … definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile 
to the security of the State” and “individual protected person[s] …detained 
as a spy or saboteur” in the occupied territory.28 Accordingly, the fact that 
Art. 46(1) AP I refers to “member of the armed forces of a Party to the con-
flict … engaging in espionage” should not be considered as a reformulation 
                                                        
24  See e.g. E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 4th ed. 2008, 489; W. H. Booth-
by, The Law of Targeting, 2012, 277. 
25  Flesche case (Holland, Special Court of Cassation, 1949) [1949] 16 AD 266 et seq., 271 
et seq. See also U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 2004, section 4.9.3; Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, ADDP 06.4, 2006, section 
7.18; US Department of Defense (note 14), section 4.17.4. 
26  See HR, Art. 29; Lieber Code, Art. 88; Brussels Declaration, Art. 19; Rules concerning 
the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Drafted by a Commis-
sion of Jurists at the Hague, December 1922-February 1923 (Hague Rules Air Warfare), avail-
able at <www.icrc.org>, Art. 27; HPCR Manual, Rule 118. 
27  See Flesche case (note 25), 271. 
28  Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 
12.8.1949 (IV GC), Art. 5. 
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of the definition of a spy.29 The possibility of considering also civilians to be 
spies in light of the AP I is confirmed by the incipit of Art. 46(1) itself, ac-
cording to which this provision is without prejudice to rules embodied in 
the IV GC.30 
Spies are defined according to a three-fold test. First, espionage requires 
an activity of information collection and transmission. Spies collect infor-
mation that is relevant for the conduct of the armed conflict and transmit or 
attempt to transmit this information to one of the parties of the conflict.31 If 
an individual accidentally or unwillingly discovers relevant information, 
they is not a spy.32 Equally, if the information is not linked to the armed 
conflict or the individual does not want to deliver it to one of the parties of 
the conflict, then they should not be considered a spy.33 
Second, spies act clandestinely or under false pretence. Consequently, 
members of armed forces have to act in disguise (e.g. without their uniform 
or other distinctive emblems) in order to be qualified as spies; whereas, any 
individual – military or civilian – who carries out their activity openly 
should not be considered a spy.34 If the clandestine character of the activity 
is not present, the activity of intelligence gathering may not be considered 
espionage. For instance, members of the armed forces openly collecting in-
formation relevant for an armed conflict fall into the definition of military 
reconnaissance, which is a lawful kind of intelligence gathering that is inher-
ently different from espionage.35 
Finally, international humanitarian law considers only individuals who 
gather information in certain areas to be spies. In this respect, conventional 
international humanitarian law shows a progressive evolution: according to 
the Lieber Code, only individuals “within or lurking about the lines of the 
                                                        
29  See K. Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in: D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law, 3rd ed. 2013, 79 et seq., 108; E. Crawford/A. Pert, Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 2015, 98. 
30  AP I, Art. 46(1): “Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol …”. 
31  Lieber Code, Art. 88; Brussels Declaration, Art. 19; HR, Art. 29; Hague Rules Air War-
fare, Art. 27; AP I, Art. 46(2); HPCR Manual, Rule 118. 
32  Brussels Declaration, Art. 22; HR, Art. 29. 
33  See G. Balladore Pallieri, Diritto bellico, 2nd ed. 1954, 223. 
34  Lieber Code, Art. 88; Brussels Declaration, Art. 19 and Art. 22; HR, Art. 29; Hague 
Rules Air Warfare, Art. 27; AP I, Art. 46(2) and Art. 46(3); HPCR Manual, Rule 120. 
35  On this topic, see generally O. J. Lissitzyn, Electronic Reconnaissance from the High 
Seas and International Law, International Law Studies 61 (1970), 563 et seq.; C. Hollweg, Mil-
itary Reconnaissance, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL, Vol. III, 1982, 279 et seq.; D. Stephens/T. 
Skousgaard, Military Reconnaissance, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), MPEPIL online ed., 2009, availa-
ble at <opil.ouplaw.com>. 
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captor” are spies;36 pursuant to the Brussels Declaration, spies are those in-
dividuals who operate in “the districts occupied by the enemy”;37 the 1899 
and 1907 Hague Regulations refer to “the zone of operations of a belliger-
ent”,38 and a similar criterion is embodied in the Hague Rules on the Air 
Warfare;39 the IV GC, more broadly, considers to be spies those who collect 
information “... in the territory of a Party to the conflict ... [or] in occupied 
territory …”40, while the AP I refers to “the territory controlled by an ad-
verse Party”.41 This last geographical qualification is the one most in line 
with contemporary customary law.42 
In brief, international humanitarian law only considers someone a spy if 
that person is present in a territory controlled by a belligerent, gathering 
information relevant for the conflict through clandestine means and/or un-
der disguise, and intending to transmit that information to the enemy.43 
 
 
b) The Penal Prosecution of Spies 
 
After having defined who is a spy and what espionage is international 
humanitarian law prescribes that spies, if captured, are not entitled to the 
status of prisoners of war.44 This means that spies are subject to the domes-
tic criminal law of the state that captures them. However, since espionage is 
not a violation of international humanitarian law, spies should not be prose-
cuted as war criminals. 
                                                        
36  Lieber Code, Art. 83. 
37  Brussels Declaration, Art. 19. 
38  HR, Art. 29. 
39  Hague Rules Air Warfare, Art. 27: “… within belligerent jurisdiction or in the zone of 
operations of a belligerent …”. 
40  IV GC, Art. 5. 
41  AP I, Art. 46(2). See also HPCR Manual, Rule 118. 
42  See Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict, 3rd ed. 2016, 280 et seq. 
43  This conclusion is confirmed by a number of military manuals. See, among the most re-
cent ones, section UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Con-
flict (JSP 383, 2004), 4.9; German Ministry of Defense, Law of Armed Conflict – Manual – 
Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2, 1.5.2013, section 345; US Department of Defense (note 
14), section 4.17.2. 
44  See HR, Art. 31; AP I, Art. 46(1); J.-M. Henckaerts/L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Custom-
ary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I, 2005, (ICRC Customary IHL), Rule 107; HPCR 
Manual, Rule 121. See also Ex parte Quirin et al. (US Supreme Court), AD 10 (1941-1942), 
564 et seq., 571. 
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International humanitarian law provides some guarantees to the captured 
spy. In this regard, one can register an important evolution. At the origins 
of the codification of the law of armed conflict, the Lieber Code provided 
that a spy should be executed by hanging, notwithstanding their gender.45 
Subsequent conventions have alleviated the treatment of spies, which can be 
punished only after a fair trial.46 Moreover, if the spy is a protected person 
under the IV GC, the individual has the right to all the guarantees provided 
by the convention itself, unless they would be prejudicial to the security of 
the state.47 However, if a spy is detained in occupied territory, they can be 
denied rights of communication if absolute military security so requires.48 
On the other hand, they must be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, 
shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial.49 Finally, one has 
to note that today it is well established that both international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law are applicable during armed con-
flict.50 Although this is not the occasion to discuss the interplay between 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law,51 suffice 
it to say that the captured spy must be treated in conformity with the rele-
vant international human rights standards, which are also relevant for the 
interpretation of international humanitarian law provisions (such as those 
regarding the right of a “fair trial”).52 
The possibility for a state to threat an individual as a spy is limited with 
respect to the time of its capture. According to a rule codified in every in-
strument dealing with espionage, an individual may not be punished as a 
                                                        
45  Lieber Code, Art. 88(2), Art. 101, and Art. 102. 
46  HR, Art. 30. An identical provision is embodied in the ICRC Customary IHL, Rule 
107. 
47  IV GC, Art. 5(1) and (3). 
48  IV GC, Art. 5(2). 
49  IV GC, Art. 5(3). 
50  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep. 1996, 
226 et seq., para. 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep. 2004, 126 et seq., para. 106 (Wall opinion); 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) (Judgment), ICJ Rep. 2005, 
168 et seq., para. 216. 
51  See generally the essays collected in P. Eden/M Haploid (eds.), Symposium: The Rela-
tionship between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 14 (2009), 441 et seq.; R. Arnold/N. Quénivet (eds.), 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in Interna-
tional Law, 2008; R. Kolb/G. Gaggioli (eds.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, 2013. 
52  See Y. Arai-Takahashi, Fair Trial Guarantees in Occupied Territory — The Interplay 
between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in: R. Arnold/N. Qué-
nivet (note 51), 449 et seq. 
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spy if they has returned to their army or the territory controlled by their 
party.53 It has been suggested that this rule applies only to spies that belong 
to an armed force, and, therefore, it would be inapplicable to civilians since 
they do not belong to any army and they are not entitled to the status of 
prisoners of war.54 This rule may be justified on different grounds: it has 
been suggested that such hard punishment of spies is a deterrent that be-
comes moot if the spies, returned to their party, have delivered the collected 
information.55 Moreover, some have argued that it is a consequence of the 
fact that spies are unlawful combatants rather than war criminals, and thus 
they can be punished only while they are actively carrying out their activi-
ty.56 Notwithstanding the legal justification behind this rule, it reflects a 
well-established state practice and body of case law developed during the 
two World Wars that is part of customary international law today.57 
 
 
2. The Application of the Rules on Espionage to Cyber 
Exploitation 
 
After having described the rules on espionage, it is necessary to try to ap-
ply them to cyber exploitation. To this end, it is worthwhile to note that no 
international humanitarian law convention deals with cyber exploitation; 
this is due to the fact that at the time of the drafting, this phenomenon did 
not yet exist. In the absence of a specific convention on cyber operations,58 
it is necessary to try to apply the existing rule to new phenomena such as 
                                                        
53  Lieber Code, Art. 104; Brussels Declarations, Art. 21; HR, Art. 31; API, Art. 46(4); 
HPCR Manual, Rule 122. 
54  See Flesche case (note 25), 272; US Department of Defense (note 14), section 4.17.5.1; Y. 
Dinstein (note 42), 279. Contra, see F. Lafouasse, L’espionnage en droit international, A.F.D.I. 
47 (2001), 63 et seq., 98 et seq.; L. Salvadego (note 6), 1192. 
55  See M. C. Ciciriello, Spionaggio (diritto internazionale), in: Enciclopedia Giuridica,  
Vol. XXX, 1993, 1 et seq., 4. 
56  See G. Balladore Pallieri (note 33), 224; Y. Dinstein (note 42), 279. 
57  See the practice analysed by G. Balladore Pallieri (note 33), 224 et seq. 
58  Some argue that such a convention should be adopted. See e.g. D. Brown, A Proposal 
for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Con-
flicts, Harv. Int’l. L.J. 47 (2006), 179 et seq. For an overview of the ongoing debate, see R. 
Liivoja, Technological Change and the Evolution of the Law of War, Int’ l Rev. of the Red 
Cross 97 (2015), 1159 et seq., 1160 et seq. 
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cyber exploitation.59 To this end, the Tallinn Manuals provide extremely 
useful guidance notwithstanding their non-binding character.60 
First, one has to consider that cyber exploitation may be conducted by 
members of armed forces or can be outsourced to civilian agencies. Agen-
cies such as the US Central Intelligence Agency are among the most promi-
nent actors in the intelligence arena and are made up by civilians.61 Poten-
tially, both civilian and military operators who are responsible for cyber 
exploitation could be considered spies. 
Second, cyber exploitation meets the criterion of the willingness to gather 
information that is relevant for the hostilities in order to transmit said in-
formation to a party of the conflict.62 
Third, cyber exploitation is per se a clandestine method of information 
gathering since the programs employed are designed to collect information 
in secrecy.63 Accordingly, if the operator is a civilian, the intelligence opera-
tion is conducted clandestinely irrespectively of any other elements thanks 
                                                        
59  See M. Roscini (note 13), 280 et seq.; N. Tsagourias, The Legal Status of Cyberspace, in: 
N. Tsagourias/R. Buchan (note 18), 13 et seq. 
60  On the value of the so-called private codifications of international customary law, such 
as the Tallinn Manual, see T. Treves, International Customary Law, in: R. Bernard (note 35), 
paras. 61-62; S. Sivakumaran, The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of 
International Law, ICLQ 66 (2017), 1 et seq., 7 et seq. For some critical remarks on the con-
tent of the Tallinn Manual, see D. Fleck, Searching for International Rules Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare: A Critical First Assessment of the New Tallinn Manual, Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 18 (2013), 331 et seq.; O. Kessler/W. Werner, Expertise, Uncertainty, and 
International Law, a Study of the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare, LJIL 26 (2013) 793 et seq.; 
W. Heintschel von Heinegg, The Tallinn Manual and International Cyber Security Law, Year-
book International Humanitarian Law 15 (2012), 3 et seq.; R. Liivoja/T. McCormack, Law in 
the Virtual Battlespace: The Tallin Manual and the Jus in Bello, Yearbook International Hu-
manitarian Law 15 (2012), 15 et seq., 45 et seq. 
61  Congressional Research Service, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramili-
tary Operations: Issues for Congress, CRS Report RS22017, 4.1.2005, 2. 
62  Republica de Colombia (note 23), 86; US Department of the Army (note 23), Section 
B-29. 
63  See Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), 410. 
“‘Clandestinely’ refers to activities undertaken secretly or secretively, as with a cyber espi-
onage operation designed to conceal the identity of the persons involved or the fact that it has 
occurred. An act of cyber information collection is ‘under false pretenses’ when so conducted 
as to create the impression that the individual concerned is entitled to access the information 
in question. In the cyber domain, it often consists of an individual masquerading as a legiti-
mate user by employing the user’s permissions to access targeted systems and data.” 
See also W. A. Owens/K. W. Dam/H. S. Lin, Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regard-
ing U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities, 2009, 81 et seq.: “The primary 
technical requirement of a cyberexploitation is that the delivery and execution of its payload 
must be accomplished quietly and undetectably – secrecy is often far less important when 
cyberattack is the mission.” 
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to the inherent clandestine character of the means employed for cyber ex-
ploitation. On the other hand, if the operator is a member of the armed 
force, the problem is more convoluted: it has been argued that, since it is 
not practically feasible to design military Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in 
order to implement the principle of distinction,64 one has to consider irrele-
vant the fact that the operator wears a uniform because “in the high-tech 
battlespace there is no practical need for such distinguishers”.65 However, 
this argument is not completely convincing since it conflicts with the 
aforementioned clear provisions regarding the fact that a member wearing 
its uniform is not a spy par definition. Respect for the principle of distinc-
tion and the role of uniforms and emblems in cyber operations are extreme-
ly complex issues due to the interplay between private and public actors on 
the one hand, and private and public infrastructures on the other.66 How-
ever, in the absence of a contrary practice, it is critical to qualify as espio-
nage cyber exploitation conducted by operators in uniform. 
Fourth, espionage requires the physical presence of the individual in the 
territory controlled by the enemy. This requirement of physical presence 
appears to be the main hindrance to considering cyber exploitation a form 
of espionage. The advantage of cyber exploitation is that it allows belliger-
ents to gather information far from the actual place where the hostilities are 
conducted, from a remote and safe position that is situated normally within 
the territory of the state that launches the cyber exploitation. Accordingly, 
operators responsible for cyber exploitation are unlikely to ever be present 
in the territory controlled by the enemy; not only would it be extremely 
risky for the operators, but it would also frustrate the main advantage of 
cyber exploitation – that is the possibility of gathering information far from 
the theatre of the armed conflict. 
Other scholars have suggested that the requirement of the physical pres-
ence of the operator in the territory controlled by the enemy could be in-
terpreted in a looser way. According to one author, the cyber exploitation 
agent can be considered physically present in the enemy territory since their 
programs infiltrate systems and networks that are located in that territory.67 
                                                        
64  H. Harrison Dinniss (note 13), 146 et seq. 
65  H. Harrison Dinniss (note 13), 147 et seq. (with reference to distinction in cyber-
attacks). See also 158 (with reference to espionage). 
66  For more on this, see K. Bannelier-Christakis, Is the Principle of Distinction Still Rele-
vant in Cyberwarfare?, in: N. Tsagourias/R. Buchan (note 18), 343 et seq. 
67  See H. Harrison Dinniss (note 13), 158 et seq. See also H. Harrison Dinniss, Participants 
in Conflict – Cyber Warriors, Patriotic Hackers and the Law of War, in: D. Saxon (ed.), Inter-
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Although it is true that international law allows that an activity originating 
from the territory of one state may be considered to have occurred in an-
other state because of how its consequences impact the other territory,68 this 
assumption does not regard the localisation of the agent – which is the crite-
rion that international humanitarian law looks at with respect to espionage. 
Actually, it is not possible to consider that the agent is present in the territo-
ry in which the targeted system is located since the malware employed for 
cyber exploitation is no more a part of the operator than an intercontinental 
missile is a component of the agent who launched it. Moreover, the fact that 
a belligerent in its territory employs the targeted system does not mean that 
material components of that system are located in its territory. In general, 
defining territoriality in the realm of cyberspace is not so easy nor is it as 
immediate as in the physical realm.69 Accordingly, the absolute requirement 
of the physical presence of the operator70 is not satisfied by considering the 
location of the targeted systems and the effects of the operations. 
In addition, one cannot consider that the presence of the agent is no 
longer necessary thanks to an evolutionary interpretation of the relevant 
international humanitarian law provisions in light of subsequent state prac-
tice.71 Simply, there is no state practice indicating this shift; on the contrary, 
                                                                                                                                  
national Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War, 2012, 251 et seq., 264 et 
seq. 
68  See generally A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2003, 278; C. Ryngaert, Jurisdic-
tion in International Law, 2008, 75-76. 
69  For an overview of this issue, see D. Midson, Geography, Territory and Sovereignty in 
Cyber Warfare, in: H. Nasu/R. McLaughlin (eds.), New Technologies and the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 2014, 75 et seq. More generally, on the relationship between the internet and territo-
ry, see A. Oddenino, La governance di Internet fra autoregolazione, sovranità statale e diritto 
internazionale, 2008. 
70  Publicists have confirmed that this requirement is essential for the existence of an act of 
espionage even in recent times, when cyber exploitation was a known phenomenon. See e.g. 
W. H. Boothby (note 24), 277; Y. Dinstein (note 42), 277. 
71  Evolutionary interpretation is based on Art. 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. On evolutionary interpretation of treaties, see generally M. Fitzmaurice, 
Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Hague Y.B. Int’l. L., Part I, 21 (2008), 101 et 
seq., Part II, 22 (2009), 3 et seq.; J. Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: 
Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, The Law 
and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 9 (2010), 443 et seq.; P.-M. Dupuy, Evolu-
tionary Interpretation of Treaties: Between Memory and Prophecy, in: E. Cannizzaro (ed.), 
The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention, 2011, 123 et seq.; G. Distefano, 
L’interprétation évolutive de la norme internationale, R.G.D.I.P. 115 (2011), 373 et seq.; G. 
Nolte (ed.), Treaties and Subsequent Practice, 2013; E. Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpreta-
tion of Treaties, 2014. 
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recent military manuals have restated this requirement.72 Consequently, 
there is no case law supporting that the relevant provisions may be inter-
preted differently due to subsequent practice. 
One has to note the view according to which, in certain circumstances, 
international humanitarian law may be applied by analogy pursuant to the 
so-called Martens Clause in order to fill gaps that are due to evolution of 
the law of armed conflict not envisaged by the drafters of the conventions.73 
However, such an operation is permitted only in order to amplify individual 
guarantees. By contrast, applying the rules on espionage to individuals fall-
ing outside the definition of spies would result in their subsequent depriva-
tion of some basic guarantees due to the inapplicability of the prisoner of 
war status to spies. 
In conclusion, it is unlikely that cyber exploitation itself amounts to es-
pionage. However, it is possible that an individual could have to perform 
cyber exploitation from within enemy territory due to the structure of the 
targeted system. Certain systems can be accessed only if the operator is 
physically close to the target. For instance, it has been reported that a Uni-
versal Serial Bus (USB) flash drive was first employed in order to spread the 
malware Stuxnet into the targeted systems of some Iranian nuclear plants.74 
In the case of Stuxnet, the cyber operations amounted to a cyber-attack, but 
it is possible that exploiting information transient or located in close com-
puter systems and networks would require a similar physical contiguity be-
tween the operator and the target. In this case, if the agent is within the ter-
ritory controlled by the enemy and the other requirements of espionage are 
met, the activity of cyber exploitation could be labelled as cyber espionage 
and the rules on espionage would be applicable.75 
                                                        
72  See e.g. German Ministry of Defense (note 43), section 345; US Department of Defense 
(note 14), section 4.17.2.2. 
73  This position was famously advocated by A. Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf 
of Simply Pie in the Sky?, EJIL 11 (2000), 187 et seq., 189 et seq. and 212 et seq. 
74  On Stuxnet, see generally A. Matrosov/E. Rodionov/D. Harley/J. Malcho, Stuxnet Un-
der the Microscope, Revision 1.31, 8, available at <go.eset.com>. For an analysis of the main 
legal issues regarding this episode, see J. Richardson, Stuxnet as Cyberwarfare: Applying the 
Law of War to the Virtual Battlefield, John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information 
Law 29 (2011), 1 et seq. 
75  See Rule 66 and the accompanying commentary in Tallinn Manual (note 13), 192 et seq., 
and Rule 89 and the accompanying commentary in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), 409 et seq. 
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However, in most cases, rules on espionage are not applicable to cyber 
exploitation due to the lack of the physical presence of the agent in the terri-
tory controlled by the enemy.76 
 
 
V. Cyber Exploitation as Direct Participation of Civilians 
in the Hostilities 
 
1. A Brief Introduction to the Direct Participation of Civilians 
in the Hostilities 
 
Although cyber exploitation falls into the definition of espionage only in 
marginal cases, it is necessary to evaluate whether it can constitute direct 
participation of civilians in the hostilities. Obviously, this rule may be appli-
cable only when the agent responsible for cyber exploitation is a civilian. 
International humanitarian law is built on the pivotal principle of distinc-
tion between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and 
military objects.77 Civilians and civilian objects are immune from attacks, 
they should not be directly targeted, belligerents have to constantly verify 
that their military operations are not launched against them, and unavoida-
ble civilian casualties are lawful only if not excessive in relation to the 
planned military advantage.78 However, the protection afforded to civilians 
is not absolute. Civilians are immune from attacks as long as they do not 
participate directly in hostilities.79 According to Art. 51(3) AP I, “[c]ivilians 
shall enjoy the protection afforded by [AP I], unless and for such time as 
                                                        
76  See Tallinn Manual (note 13), 193; L. Doswald-Beck, Some Thoughts on Computer 
Network Attack and the International Law of Armed Conflict, in: M. N. Schmitt/B. T. 
O’Donnell (eds.), Computer Network Attack and International Law, 2002, 163 et seq., 172; 
M. Roscini (note 13), 240; D. Turns, Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 17 (2012) 279 et seq., 290. 
77  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (note 50), paras. 78-79. On this 
topic, see generally N. Melzer, The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combat-
ants, in: A. Clapham/P. Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed 
Conflict, 2014, 296 et seq. 
78  On the protection of civilians during armed conflict — a topic too vast to be explored 
in this occasion — see generally N. Ronzitti, Civilian Population in Armed Conflict, in: R. 
Wolfrum (note 35); Y. Dinstein (note 42), 139 et seq. 
79  On this topic, see generally G. Bartolini, The Participation of Civilians in Hostilities, 
in: M. Matheson/D. Momtaz (eds.), Rules and Institutions of International Humanitarian 
Law Put to the Test of Recent Armed Conflicts, 2010, 321 et seq.; E. Crawford, Identifying 
the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict, 2015; Y. Disntein (note 42), 174 et seq. 
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they take a direct part in hostilities”. This provision was adopted unani-
mously and no reservation has been made. It is part of international cus-
tomary law,80 as demonstrated by the case law of the Israel Supreme 
Court,81 which is extremely relevant since Israel is not party to AP I.82 This 
rule is considered to be relevant also in relation to cyber operations.83 
The main issue regarding Art. 51(3) AP I is that its application is quite 
problematic due to a lack of clarity on its elements. The term “hostilities” 
connotes more than mere military attacks; accordingly, it also encompasses 
conduct that does not quite reach the definition of an attack pursuant to 
Art. 49(1) AP I.84 Obviously, if a civilian performs an attack against a bellig-
erent, their conduct is considered direct participation in the hostilities. 
However, many other activities are not per se harmful, and one has to ana-
lyse on a case-by-case basis whether they fall into the definition of direct 
participation of civilians in the hostilities. In theory, there are two possible, 
albeit extreme, solutions: considering only fighting activities to be covered 
by this rule, or considering that every activity related to the war effort re-
moves civilian immunity from attacks. 
Official documents such as military manuals are not particularly useful in 
dispelling doubts over which activities fall into the category of direct partic-
ipation of civilians, since very often they just restate the AP I provision, or 
the scant available lists are discordant.85 In order to clarify the content of 
this rule, in 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross published 
an Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostili-
ties under International Humanitarian Law (Interpretive Guidance). Al-
                                                        
80  ICRC Customary IHL, Rule 6. 
81  Israel Supreme Court: Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (Targeted 
Killings case), International Legal Materials 46 (2007), 375 et seq., para. 30. See US Depart-
ment of Defense (note 14), section 5.8. 
82  On the issue of the customary status of rules embodied in treaty not ratified by a rele-
vant number of states, see North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Denmark — Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) (Judgment), ICJ Rep. 1969, 3 et 
seq., paras. 76-77. 
83  See generally Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), Rule 97; M. Roscini (note 13), 202 et seq. 
More specifically, this issue was addressed by S. Watts, Combatant Status and Computer 
Network Attack. Va. J. Int’l L. 50 (2010), 391 et seq.; I. Kilovaty, ICRC, NATO, and the U.S. 
— Direct Participation in Hacktivities — Targeting Private Contractors and Civilians in Cy-
berspace under International Humanitarian Law. Duke Law & Technology Review 15 (2016), 
1 et seq. 
84  See C. Pilloud/Y. Sandoz/C. Swinarski/B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1987, 
para. 1943. 
85  See the references collected in ICRC Customary IHL, Vol. II, 108 et seq. 
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though the Guidance is a non-binding instrument,86 it provides a useful 
analysis of state practice and opinio juris, and may help in the interpretation 
and practical application of the rule. 
According to the Interpretive Guidance, conduct performed by a civilian 
is a kind of direct participation in the hostilities if it meets three cumulative 
criteria: 
 
“1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, 
or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of 
harm); 2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to 
result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that 
act constitutes an integral part (direct causation); 3. the act must be specifically 
designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to 
the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).”87 
 
Since these criteria are in line with the scant state practice, case law, and 
academic opinions available,88 attempting to apply them to cyber exploita-
tion may provide valuable insight. 
 
 
2. Direct Participation of Civilians in the Hostilities and Cyber 
Exploitation 
 
a) Intelligence Gathering as Direct Participation 
 
Intelligence gathering activity performed by civilians may be considered a 
form of participation in the hostilities, since this last term also encompasses 
conduct that is not an attack. The main issue is whether intelligence gather-
ing is a form of direct or indirect participation. 
                                                        
86  N. Melzer (ed.), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities under International Humanitarian Law, Adopted by the Assembly of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross on 26.2.2009, Int’ l Rev. of the Red Cross 90 (2008), 991 et seq. 
(Interpretive Guidance). For some remarks on them, see D. Akande, Clearing the Fog of 
War? The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, ICLQ 59 
(2010), 180 et seq.; K. Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities Interpretive Guidance”, N. Y. U. J. Int’ l L. & Pol. 42 
(2010), 641 et seq. 
87  Interpretive Guidance (note 86), 995 et seq. 
88  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Third Report on Human Rights Situation in 
Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9, rev 1, 26.2.1998, Chapter IV, para. 53; Targeted Kill-
ings case (note 81), para. 37 et seq. See also G. Bartolini (note 79), 321 et seq., 352 et seq. 
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Case law and state practice appear partially discordant. According to Is-
rael – which is not party to the AP I – intelligence gathering is always con-
sidered to be direct participation in the hostilities. This is the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Israel,89 confirmed also by the practice related to the 
armed operations conducted in the Strip of Gaza.90 The rule is also embod-
ied in some less recent US military manuals.91 
However, the opinion of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
appears to take the opposite stance, at least in its Commentary to the Two 
Additional Protocols, in which intelligence gathering – albeit if conducted 
by children – seems to be always considered a form of indirect participation 
in the hostilities, thus falling outside the scope of Art. 51 (3) AP I.92 
The case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia enlists intelligence gathering in both the lists of direct and indirect 
forms of participation of civilians in the hostilities. According to the deci-
sion in the Strugar case: 
 
“Examples of active or direct participation include: … transmitting military in-
formation for the immediate use of a belligerent … Examples of indirect partici-
pation include: … gathering and transmitting military information.”93 
 
This last approach, far from being contradictory, is the most correct. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia makes a distinc-
tion between the mere activity of gathering and transmitting military infor-
mation – which is a form of indirect participation – and the transmission of 
military information that is employed for the immediate use of the belliger-
ent. In this last case, there is a genuine causal link between the intelligence 
activity and harm to the enemy; this link is considered the pivotal criterion 
for establishing whether a conduct constitutes direct participation of civil-
ians in the hostilities. Interestingly, the 2016 US military manual adopts an 
approach more cautious than in the past and embodies a similar considera-
tion, with practical examples of gathering and transmitting information that 
                                                        
89  Targeted Killings case (note 81), para. 35. 
90  See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Operation Pillar of Defense – IDF Updates, 
22.11.2012, available at <mfa.gov.il>: “The IDF also surgically targeted a Hamas intelligence 
operations center on 7th floor of a media building in Gaza City. Reporters in the building 
were unharmed.” 
91  US Air Force, The Commander’s Handbook, Pamphlet 110 et seq., 1980, section 2-8. 
92  See C. Pilloud/Y. Sandoz/C. Swinarski/B. Zimmermann (note 84), para. 3187. See also 
L. Salvadego (note 6), 1191, according to which civilians involved in espionage are not de-
prived of their immunity from attack for the time they perform acts of espionage. 
93  See ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-A, 17.7.2008, para. 177. 
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are relevant for the immediate use of belligerents.94 This approach is em-
bodied in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 as well.95 
Accordingly, intelligence activity may be considered a form of both di-
rect and indirect participation; it depends on whether concretely the activity 
performed meets the requirements of the threshold of harm, direct causa-




b) Why Direct Participation of Civilians Is Not a Practical Answer to 
Cyber Exploitation 
 
In light of the analysis conducted above, cyber exploitation may be con-
sidered a form of direct participation of civilians in the hostilities if it is per-
formed by civilians, and if it directly causes harm to the enemy in order to 
support a party of an armed conflict. This conclusion is also supported by 
the Interpretive Guidance and by the Tallinn Manuals, even if these last 
documents intermingle cyber exploitation with cyber-attacks96 – an opinion 
this author does not share.97 Accordingly, if all these requirements are satis-
fied, the operators responsible for cyber exploitation may be targeted. 
There is also a tentative state practice in support of this view, even if the 
information available is incomplete and should be handled with care. It has 
been reported that the US, which typically considers intelligence gathering 
to be a form of direct participation in the hostilities, has targeted hackers 
                                                        
94  See US Department of Defense (note 14), section 5.8.3.1: 
“Examples of Taking a Direct Part in Hostilities. The following acts are generally consid-
ered taking a direct part in hostilities that would deprive civilians who perform them of pro-
tection from being made the object of attack. These examples are illustrative and not exhaus-
tive: … [P]roviding or relaying information of immediate use in combat operations, such as: 
acting as an artillery spotter or member of a ground observer corps or otherwise relaying in-
formation to be used to direct an airstrike, mortar attack, or ambush; and acting as a guide or 
lookout for combatants conducting military operations.” 
95  Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), 430. 
96  See Interpretive Guidance (note 86), 1017-1018; Tallinn Manual (note 13), 194; Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 (note 13), 412. 
97  On the need to make a distinction between these two kinds of cyber operations, see H. 
Lin, Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law, Int’ l Rev. of the Red Cross 94 
(2012), 515 et seq., 518 et seq.; A. Wortham, Should Cyber Exploitation Ever Constitute a 
Demonstration of Hostile Intent That May Violate UN Charter Provisions Prohibiting the 
Threat or Use of Force?, Federal Communications Law Journal 64 (2012), 643 et seq., 646 et 
seq.; M. Roscini (note 13), 16 et seq. 
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affiliated with the Islamic State.98 As aforementioned, cyber operators affili-
ated with the Islamic State have been accused of having stolen US cyber-
data, thereby performing cyber exploitation.99 However, the present author 
has no sufficient information in order to assess whether the targeted hackers 
have been attacked because of their activity of cyber exploitation – if any – 
or because of other activities they have performed through the cyberspace, 
such as cyber-attacks and propaganda.100 
In addition, the German Military manual explicitly considers that people 
who “engage in electronic warfare or computer network operations” lose 
their protection as civilians.101 This suggests that all cyber operations – both 
cyber-attacks and cyber exploitation – are considered direct participation in 
the hostilities. However, the lack of any definition of cyber operation in the 
German manual suggests a cautious approach when making such an infer-
ence. 
However, even assuming that the US is targeting individuals responsible 
for cyber exploitation and that Germany considers them to be civilians di-
rectly participating in hostilities, the application of the rule of the direct 
participation in hostilities is highly impractical in these cases. Indeed, this 
rule aims to allow states to identify and target civilians who act as combat-
ants. However, in cyberspace it is extremely difficult to identify the respon-
sibility for each cyber operation – both cyber-attacks and cyber exploita-
tion. The distance between the operator and the target, the cyberspace itself 
that enables identification of IP addresses but not physical individuals at the 
keyboards, and the fact that cyber exploitation is a process performed by a 
number of individuals with different tasks (programmers, operators, ana-
lysts), makes the identification of the target almost impossible.102 
Moreover, civilians who are not physically present within the territory of 
a state party to the conflict may still launch cyber operations such as cyber 
exploitation. In this case, even if they would meet the criteria to be consid-
ered civilians who participate directly in the hostilities, their targeting is ra-
                                                        
 98  See US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Col. Warren 
via Teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq, 29.12.2015, available at <www.defense.gov>. 
 99  See Section III. 
100  According to the US Department of Defense (note 98): “[O]ur one high-value target 
who was killed … was a hacker. He kind of led some of their hacking programs. He also facil-
itated development of weapons and some of their surveillance techniques.” (emphasis added). 
101  German Ministry of Defense (note 43) section 1120. 
102  On this issue, see H. Harrison Dinniss, Participants (note 67), 271 et seq.; D. Turns 
(note 76), 279 et seq., 289 et seq.; E. Crawford, Virtual Battleground: Direct Participation in 
Cyber Warfare, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 9 (2013), 1 et 
seq., 13 et seq. 
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ther unpractical.103 For instance, in the aforementioned case of the Kosovo 
citizens arrested in Malaysia under the suspicion of having stolen US classi-
fied data on behalf of the Islamic State, a US military action against them 
would have been a patent violation of Malaysia sovereignty (and, likely, an 
act of aggression). Furthermore, even in the case of the consent of Malaysia 
to such an operation, there may be serious concerns regarding Malaysia’s 
respect for its human rights obligation to protect individuals under its juris-
diction. Consequently, targeting such an individual who dwells outside the 
belligerents’ territory is rather unfeasible. The most correct approach is just 
charging the suspect under the domestic law of the state of residence – 
which is exactly what happened in the case of the alleged Kosovo hackers. 
Moreover, according to Art. 51 (3) AP I, civilians may be targeted only 
for the time they take part into the hostilities.104 Cyber operations in gen-
eral, and specifically cyber exploitation, are conducted very quickly with 
regard to the targeting of the enemy network with malware;105 then, the 
program may steal data for a long period of time, without any human activi-
ty. Which element should be considered relevant for the application of the 
rule on direct participation – a rule that is applicable only for the time the 
civilian directly participates in the hostilities? During the elaboration of the 
Tallinn Manuals, it was suggested that civilian operators were targetable for 
the time of the operation and the time in which the program was in func-
tion.106 However, the majority of the convened experts rejected this view.107 
Accordingly, the only answer appears to be that only the human action is 
relevant since, as aforementioned, the malware per se is not a component of 
the human operator.108 Consequently, it appears incredibly unlikely that a 
belligerent discovers the intrusion in one of its systems immediately, identi-
fies the operator responsible at once, and immediately launches an attack 
                                                        
103  See F. Delrue, Civilian Direct Participation in Cyber Hostilities, IDP. Revista de Inter-
net, Derecho y Política 19 (2014), para. 4, available at <journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>. 
104  The provisions states: “…or such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Its in-
terpretation is controversial. For more on this, see W. H. Boothby, “And for such Time as”: 
The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, N. Y. U. J. Int’ l L. & Pol. 42 
(2010), 741 et seq. 
105  See J. M. Prescott, Direct Participation in Cyber Hostilities: Terms of Reference for 
Like-Minded States?, in: C. Czosseck/R. Ottis/K. Ziollkowski (eds.), Proceedings of the 2012 
4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2012, 251 et seq., 258 et seq. 
106  Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), 431. 
107  Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 13), 431. 
108  See Section IV. 2. 
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against it while the intrusion – the relevant activity – is still being per-
formed.109 
In conclusion, even if cyber exploitation may be seen as direct participa-






In this author’s opinion, only one international humanitarian law rule is 
clearly applicable to cyber exploitation: the fact that it is a legitimate means 
of information gathering in times of war pursuant to Art. 24 HR. 
Rules on espionage are applicable only in the case of cyber espionage, a 
marginal occurrence since the use of cyber capabilities in order to collect 
data was developed also in order to avoid risks due to proximity with the 
enemy. 
Although the rule of direct participation of civilians in the hostilities may 
be applied to cyber exploitation from a theoretical point of view, in practice, 
it seems highly difficult for the targeted belligerent to identify and attack 
the civilian responsible for cyber exploitation while that civilian is still per-
forming that operation. 
Finally, other international humanitarian law rules apply to the operators 
of cyber exploitation; e.g., if this individual is a member of the enemy armed 
forces, they may be targeted. However, this possibility is not linked to the 
activity performed, but rather to their belonging to the enemy army. 
However, the fact that international humanitarian law does not specifical-
ly address cyber exploitation is not a source of concern. International hu-
manitarian law never presumed to regulate every activity performed during 
and linked to an armed conflict. As affirmed by the International Court of 
Justice in its Wall opinion, certain conduct is regulated by international hu-
manitarian law, while other conduct is regulated by international humani-
tarian law and other branches of international law, and yet another type of 
conduct is regulated by other branches of international law.110 In the case of 
cyber exploitation, branches such as international human rights law, diplo-
matic law, the law of the sea, and international space law may play a more 
important role. This final suggestion paves the way for further analysis and 
                                                        
109  The temporal issue is considered more relevant in cyber intelligence operation rather 
than in cyber-attacks by I. Kilovaty (note 83), 28. 
110  See Wall opinion (note 50), para. 106. See also DRC v. Uganda (note 50), para 2016. 
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research since the effects of the war on treaties is far from being a settled 
issue in international law, as demonstrated by the work of the International 
Law Commission.111 For instance, a thorough analysis of the applicability 
of the right to privacy during armed conflict could provide some answers to 
the legality of cyber exploitation. 
                                                        
111  See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts 
on Treaties, (2011), available at <legal.un.org>. On this topic, see generally M. K. Prescott, 
How War Affects Treaties between Belligerents: A Case Study of the Gulf War, Emory Inter-
national Law Review 7 (1993), 197 et seq.; M. Mancini, Stato di guerra e conflitto armato nel 
diritto internazionale, 2009, 257 et seq.; A. Pronto, The Effect of War on Law — What Hap-
pens to Their Treaties When States Go to War?, Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 2 (2013), 227 et seq. 
